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1 Introduction
Since Bitcoin’s inception in 2008, it has became attractive investments for both trading and min-
ing. To mine Bitcoins, a miner has to invest in computing power and pay for electricity to solve
cryptographic puzzles for rewards, if it becomes the first to solve a puzzle, paid in Bitcoin. Given
that mining is such a resource intensive effort, miners seek new strategies trying to make the mining
process more profitable. One obvious strategy is to adopt faster and/or more energy-efficient com-
pute hardware [1]. In addition, miners could launch attacks, such as Selfish [2] and Withholding [3],
to earn more Bitcoins. In this article, we introduce two new tactics termed Shutdown and Towing
and analyze their profitability of earning more Bitcoins. In the following, we first review a simple
background, and then present the two tactics.
2 Review of key Bitcoin concepts
There is no central authority in the Bitcoin system to approve transactions. Therefore, miners
collect valid transactions in a (local) block, add a Coinbase transaction for a mining award, compete
to solve a puzzle, and then, upon solving a puzzle, broadcast the valid block to the network. Later,
all other miners will accept the new valid block and append it to the existing blockchain. As the
probability of individual miners’ winning the puzzle-solving competition diminishes when more
miners are competing, mining pools are formed to mine cooperatively. To articulate Towing and
Shutdown tactics, we consider a simplified Bitcoin network of five mining pools.
As shown in [4], the total hash-rate (Htotal) (hashes/second) of the Bitcoin network fluctuates
over time. Puzzles could be solved sooner when Htotal increases, and vice versa. Such fluctuation
may vary the average block generation time which is expected to be around 10 minutes, according
to the Bitcoin protocol. To address this issue, Bitcoin adjusts the mining difficulty (D) of solving
puzzles according to Htotal so as to maintain the 10-minute average block generation time.
3 Towing tactic
This section introduces the idea of Towing tactic. Let R denotes the reward of each block generation,
and C the average cost for solving a puzzle. Then the net utility of each block mining is R − C.
Suppose that the block (with height) 1000 had been mined by the mining pool A, as depicted in
Fig. 1. Therefore, in its Coinbase transaction, the mining pool A received the reward of 50 BTCs
(We do not consider transaction fee, for simplicity.) and it earns net utility 40 BTCs if we consider
C = 10 BTCs.
Fig. 1 shows that the block 1001 was mined by the mining pool E. After a miner solves a
puzzle, it needs to disseminate the valid block to the Bitcoin network. For various reasons, such
as network latency, some of the miners/pools do not receive a newly mined block and continue
mining, and hence a blockchain split could happen such as the two blocks of the same height 1002
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Figure 1: A Split Scenario
in Fig. 1, where the block in the upper branch is mined by the mining pool A and the block in the
lower branch by the mining pool B.
The issue now is that which branch should be agreed upon as the new blockchain head by the
entire network. In the Bitcoin protocol, the method to resolve this dilemma is that miners accept
the first received block and reject the later ones with the same height. Therefore, assuming the
block generated by the mining pool A is propagated sooner, more miners probably will accept it and
try to continue mining on it. Sometimes, both branches continued to be the head for more mining
and additional blocks were added to them. However, eventually one branch would be longer and
miners accept the longer branch so that the shorter branch is discarded to become orphan blocks.
Although this split may persist into block 1003, we assume that the shorter branch becomes orphan
after (the first) block 1003 has been added into the blockchain. Let Hi be the sum of hash-rates of
the miners/mining pools who try to append a block 1003 onto branch i. The probability of branch
i winning this competition (Pi) is Hi/Htotal.
Suppose that mining pools B and C each has 20% of Htotal and three other mining pools have
the remaining 60% of Htotal. Without loss of generality, let’s say that mining pool B will continue
with the lower branch to mine block 1003, then Plower = 20%. Other mining pools choose the upper
branch, since they received block 1002 from the mining pool A sooner. Therefore, the mining pool
B expect to get Plower · (R− C) = 8 (BTCs) for block 1003.
If a mining pool wants to increase its expected net utility, it could increase the chance of winning
by attracting more miners to its branch. However, the Bitcoin protocol advises miners/pools to
work on the first received block. Therefore, when a miner receives a message from a peer proposing
a new block with the same height, it will reject this new block. Instead, mining pools can apply
Towing tactic with the prerequisite that two mining pools had agreed that one pool will help the
other when the latter sticks in a split. Therefore, if a mining pool is mining on a block and receives
a new message proposing a block with the same height from its accomplice, it will give up the
current mining activity to accept the new block and mine on it.
In our simple network, suppose that mining pools B and C have agreed to apply the Towing
tactic. On the split in Fig. 1, the mining pool C sees the opportunity to apply the Towing tactic
and support the mining pool B. This means that although the mining pool C received the block
of the upper branch earlier, it gives up the upper branch and cooperate with the mining pool B
to mine on the lower branch and double the new Plower. Therefore, the expected utility for the
mining pool B will be increased to 16 (BTCs).
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4 Temporary Shutdown tactic
This section discusses the profitability of using temporary Shutdown tactic to earn more Bitcoin.
We term each sequence of 2,016 blocks as a mining period (P ) so that the very first 2,016 blocks on
the Bitcoin blockchain would be P 1, the subsequent 2,016 blocks on the Bitcoin blockchain would
be P 2, and so on. Let tj be the time (in days) taken to generate all the 2,016 blocks of mining
period P j , which is supposed to be two weeks, as mining each block is expected to take 10 minutes
on average.
When Htotal of the Bitcoin network increases, new blocks could be generated sooner than 10
minutes, so that tj could be less than two weeks. Therefore, before starting the subsequent mining
period, mining difficulty should be adjusted to a higher value to decelerate the block generation in
the next mining period, and vice versa. In the Bitcoin protocol, the mining difficulty for mining
period P j (Dj) changes at the end of mining period P j−1, and is inversely proportional to tj−1,
i.e., Dj = Dj−1 · (14 days)/tj−1. We denote Hjtotal to be the average total hash-rate of the Bitcoin
network during mining period P j and Hji the average total hash-rate of mining pool i during mining
period P j . The daily expected utility for mining pool i in mining period P j (DEU ji ) is calculated
by Eq. 1, where rji is the ratio of H
j
i over H
j
total.
DEU ji = (r
j
i · (R− C) · 2016)/tj (1)
To demonstrate the potential profitability of the Shutdown tactic, we analyze a simple scenario
as depicted in Fig. 2. We assume that R is 12.5 BTCs for mining period P 300, and do not consider
transaction fees. As a reference, we assume that it take all the mining pools, with a reference
total hash-rate Hr, a reference mining cost Cr of 11.5 BTCs, and a reference mining difficulty Dr,
to complete mining period P 301 in 14 days. We supposed before that there are five mining pools
forming our simplified Bitcoin network, and r301i = 20% for each mining pool i. Therefore, DEU
301
i
computes to 28.80 BTCs, according to Eq. 1, for each mining pool i, as shown across the ‘None’
row in Table 1.
Figure 2: Temporary Shutdown in a simple scenario,
As mining difficulty Dj+1 is adjusted (indirectly) according to Hjtotal, by applying the Shutdown
tactic, a mining pool shuts down a portion of its compute power to decrease the Htotal of the
Bitcoin network, which increases the block generation time, and hence, simplifies the puzzles for
the subsequent mining period. As the result, the net profit increases as solving simpler puzzles
costs less.
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Mining Pool A Mining Pool B Mining Pool C Mining Pool D Mining Pool E
Mode H DEU IV H DEU IV H DEU IV H DEU IV H DEU IV
None 20 28.80 0 20 28.80 0 20 28.80 0 20 28.80 0 20 28.80 0
ST 10 38.74 35 20 46.7 62 20 46.7 62 20 46.7 62 20 46.7 62
Table 1: Results for using the shutdown tactic
For instance, suppose that, upon starting P 302, the mining pool A shuts down half of its
compute power to decrease its corresponding hash-rates to H302A = 0.1Hr, as depicted in Fig. 2, so
that r302A = (0.1Hr)/(0.9Hr). As t
301 is 14 days, the mining difficulty D302 stays the same from
the previous period. Lower H302total (= 0.9Hr) prolongs the mining of new blocks in P
302 to 11.11
minutes each, so that P 302 takes 15.56 days to mine its 2,016 blocks. At the end of P 302, as t302 is
longer than two weeks, the Bitcoin protocol decreases its mining difficulty for P 303 to D303 = 0.9Dr,
which decreases the cost to 0.9Cr or 10.35 BTCs. Then, upon starting the mining period P
303,
mining pool A turns the shutdown compute power back on to restore H303A back to 0.2Hr, which
speeds up puzzle solving and decreases t303 to 12.6 days.
Row ‘ST’ in Table 1 shows that when mining pool A shuts down half of its compute power,
DEU (averaged over both mining periods of P 302 and P 303) for all the mining pools increases. The
Improvement Values (IV) denote that DEU of mining pool A increases by 35%, and 62% for all the
other mining pools. This shows that although other mining pools did not shut down any portion
of their compute power, they gain more profits than mining pool A. As D304 = 1.1D303 = Dr, the
mining cost is Cr and DEU computes to 28.80 BTCs during the mining period 304, similar to the
mining period 301.
5 Future Work
In this article, we introduced the Towing and Shutdown tactics and demonstrated how mining
pools could increase their net mining utilities by applying these two tactics. For a comprehensive
analysis of the Shutdown tactic, we need to answer more complicated questions. For instance,
with the execution of the Shutdown tactic by mining pools, would new independent miners be
incentivized to join the Bitcoin network and start mining, which might nullify the tactic? In
addition, could the scale of shutdown be optimized to maximize mining profits? To analyze the
Towing tactic in the actual Bitcoin network, we would need to consider more accurate reward and
cost values, and the role of delay in disseminating blocks.
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